“Persons Act, Natures Are” – Maximus the Confessor and the Trinitarian Debate
Peter J. Wallace
It was good to see Lewis Ayres comment today. I had some of the same concerns about the blithe use of “Nicene” – and a tendency on the part of many participants to talk as though all of the words we are using here are obvious in meaning.
The debate over the meaning of the Nicene Creed continued for several hundred years. Chalcedon, after all, sought to explicate the meaning of “was made man.” And particularly, much of the discussion of the two wills of Christ took place three hundred years after Nicea!
For myself, I spent a decade wrestling with the Trinitarian and Christological controversies before I finally discovered Maximus the Confessor. (I’d like to say that now everything is perfectly clear to me – but then Maximus would box my ears for denying the mystery of God!).
Maximus the Confessor was a seventh century theologian who helped formulate the doctrine of the two natures of Christ – particularly in the Monothelite controversy. The Monothelites claimed that Christ had only one will and one energy. (He also wrote a glorious exposition of the liturgy – the Mystagogia – you can get a sense for it here).
What we affirm in the Nicene Creed and the Chalcedonian definition is that the second person of the Trinity is the one person of Jesus Christ.
In the 6th and 7th centuries the Monothelites claimed that there was one theandric energy and will (and by “theandric” they meant “pertaining to the God-man”). They said that in Christ the two natures had come together, constituting an indivisible unity, discerned in a single energy and/or will. Their goal was laudable: they wanted to resolve the schism between the Chalcedonians and the Monophysites (though, in fairness, there were a lot more than two parties in the debate).
But Maximus rightly understood the problem: a “theandric” energy and/or will is neither divine nor human. If Jesus’ will is “theandric” – then his will is not very God of very God. Nor is his will truly human. Christ may not lack any natural property of humanity or divinity. “How again, if the Word made flesh does not himself will naturally as a human being and perform things in accordance with nature, how can he willingly undergo hunger and thirst, labour and weariness, sleep and all the rest? For the Word does not simply will and perform these things in accordance with the infinite nature beyond being that he has together with the Father and the Spirit.” (Opuscule 7, 77B)
Much of our discussion of “will” and “energy” have to do with our ordinary human experience of willing (deciding what to do) and doing (putting our decisions into practice). What does it mean that Christ has two wills? Certainly not that Christ is a split personality with his two wills debating over what he will do! Certainly the fact that he has two energies does not mean that he is going two different directions at the same time!
And so Maximus articulated his most central insight of Christology – namely, that persons act; natures are. Christ does not have two centers of deliberation. Rather, Christ has two “natural wills” – in other words, Christ himself (the second person of the Trinity) acts according to the principles of both natures.
As processes, energy and will proceed from one’s nature(s). But as result, energy and will are expressions of the person. If Jesus had no human process of willing, he would never choose to eat, because his divine will would have no need for such a decision. But the Son of God did choose to eat because his person willed to do so on the basis of his fully human property of will and energy. As Andrew Louth summarizes this, “the Incarnate Word possesses as a human being the natural disposition to will, and this is moved and shaped by the divine will” (Louth, p61).
But what does it mean for God to will? After all, we are used to deliberating and deciding (that is what we mean by “will”). But God does not need to “deliberate” (the term Maximus uses is “gnomic”). He does not acquire knowledge the same way that we do – and so God does not “deliberate” about what he will do. His will – like his knowledge – is intuitive and immediate.
[A note to my readers: scripture often speaks of God holding council, asking questions, deliberating, etc. But this is done for our benefit – not his. The God who knows the end from the beginning does not need to deliberate as to what he will do in the middle.]
When we talk about the two “wills” in Christ, we need to distinguish between the idea of “natural will” (namely, the principle of willing) and the idea of “deliberative will” (namely, the process of deliberation by which you and I go about willing). Maximus argues that “When the Fathers say that there are two natural wills in Christ, they mean that there are two natural laws, not two inclinations [gnomai].” (Op 3, 45B)
The natural will is “the natural appetency of the flesh endowed with a rational soul,” while the gnomic will is “the longing of the mind of a particular man moved by an opinion.” “For to be disposed by nature to will and to will are not the same thing.” (Op 3, 48A)
But think about the alternative. What if Christ has only one will? Well, if this will is natural (pertaining to his nature), then his nature is neither related to the Father or Mary. But if this will is gnomic (deliberative), and his one will is the will of the divine nature then the Godhead will be subject to passions – inclinations. Or if this one will is simply human, then he is not God. (Op 3, 56A)
[God is not subject to passions – he is not helplessly acted upon by others. He certainly has affections – emotions – but the “passions” ordinarily refer to the wild uncontrollable urges of the flesh.]
Therefore, Maximus insists that there are two natural wills in Christ. In other words, there are two principles of willing. But there is no deliberative will in Christ. After all, the divine will does not deliberate. God does not “debate and discuss” the question of what is best to do. As Maximus puts it, “this will is not at all deliberative [gnomic], but properly natural, eternally formed and moved by its essential Godhead to the fulfillment of the economy. And it is wholly and thoroughly deified by its agreement and concord with the Father’s will, and can properly be said to have become divine in virtue of the union, but not by nature. For nothing at all changes its nature by being deified.” (Op 7, 81D)
Some had suggested in Maximus’ day that within the Trinity, “there is a will for every person,” and therefore there are three [gnomic] wills in the Trinity. If will attaches to person, then it cannot be “natural” (pertaining to nature), but must be gnomic (deliberative), and therefore there would be deliberation and possibly even disagreement within the Trinity. (Op 3, 52C-D)
I fear that I may have lost some of my readers along the way. If you insist on trying to understand the incomprehensible God, you will find yourself in deep waters. The history of the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of the Incarnation demonstrates that no one has come up with exactly the right way to say it. Rather, there are a whole lot of very bad ways to say it, and only a few acceptable ways to say it. There are many ways of speaking that contradict what the scriptures teach about God and Christ. There are very few that do not! Hopefully Maximus helps us to remember that when we use language to describe God, we frequently are required to make distinctions that we don’t normally think about (e.g., the distinction between natural and gnomic wills).
But if you forget everything else, hang on to that central insight of Maximus that persons act, natures are. Natures don’t do things. Persons do things — according to their nature(s).
All quotations from Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor (London: Routledge, 1996).
For someone who is trying very hard to follow here, I wonder if you could comment on Jesus’ experience in the Garden of Gethsemene. When Jesus says “Nevertheless, not my will, but yours be done”, how would what Maximus says here fit that portion of Scripture?
I agree and affirm that God has no deliberative will, but in the person of the God-man, I have always taken Him to be wrestling in His person to do that which He was sent to do. That looks like a person deliberating according to the two principles of two natures. I see now I should not say “wrestling in His human *nature*”, but I’m wondering if you would comment on how to think about this event as I fear my speaking/thinking is loose.
Thank you for this post. It challenges me and encourages me to attempt to press further up and further in, as the Lord allows.
Maximus says in Opuscule 7, “he was in truth and properly a human being: to this his natural will bears witness in his plea to be spared from death that took place in accordance with the economy. [The “economy” refers to the plan of redemption]. And again, that the human will is wholly deified, in its agreement with the divine will itself, since it is eternally moved and shaped by it and in accordance with it, is clear when he shows that all that matters is a perfect verification of the will of the Father, in his saying as a human being, ‘Not mine, but your will be done,’ by this giving himself as a type and example of setting aside our own will by the perfect fulfillment of the divine, even if because of this we find ourselves face to face with death. For unless he became a human being by nature, and possessed a natural human will, and submitted this in accordance with the economy and constrained it to union with the Father’s will, and said to the Father himself, ‘Not my will be done, but yours,’ then clearly he said this as God by nature, and this would show that he did not possess a will, identical with and equal to that of the Father, but another one, different by nature.” (Op 7 80D)
Thank you, that’s helpful to read.
Very informative. The actual arguments for the will attaching to nature, rather than to person, have eluded me in the past, but I begin to see the motivation.
I still have questions though. This part, for example:
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But Maximus rightly understood the problem: a “theandric” energy and/or will is neither divine nor human. If Jesus’ will is “theandric” – then his will is not very God of very God. Nor is his will truly human. Christ may not lack any natural property of humanity or divinity.”
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It seems to conflict with this later statement:
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Therefore, Maximus insists that there are two natural wills in Christ. In other words, there are two principles of willing. But there is no deliberative will in Christ. After all, the divine will does not deliberate.
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I think I understand the distinction between a natural will and a deliberative (gnomic) will. However, if there is no deliberative will in Christ, then Christ would seem to lack a natural property of humanity. We have deliberative wills. That contradicts the earlier claim.
Perhaps the argument is that Christ has a natural (deliberative?) human will, but that natural _process_ was never allowed to be _expressed_ by the Person. Perhaps it was effectively overruled by the divine will (because of deification)? This then means that the Person of Jesus only has one _expressed_ will. (It effectively becomes a monothelite position, in terms of actual expressed will.)
However, if Christ’s natural human will was not allowed to express (because of deification?), then how was Christ able to will to eat, since such a desire does not come from His divine will? How was Christ able to deliberate to decide whether to fast, for example?
Any clarification would be appreciated.
Thank you for the helpful article.
Deliberation is what we do with our will. Think about the parallel to “energies.” There are two natural energies in Christ — but there is one who acts. In the same way there are two natural wills in Christ — but there is one who wills. There are not two different centers of consciousness. The divine will never *overruled* the human will, because deification does not overrule humanity, but the human will was always in submission to the divine and remained in perfect harmony with the divine. Again, Maximus: “Severus destroys the natural will of Christ’s humanity, not seeing that this movement of desire is constituted as the most proper and primary property of every rational nature. The Fathers seeing this, openly confessed the difference between two natural, but not *gnomic* wills in Christ, lest they proclaim him double-minded and double-willed, and fighting against himself, so to speak, in the discord of his thoughts, and therefore double-personed.” (Op 3, 56B)
The assertion of a human gnomic will is the heart of Nestorianism (giving the humanity of Christ a distinct operation from the divinity of Christ). Will and energy are *properties* not *operations.*
So to answer you questions at the end: persons act according to their natures. Since Christ was fully man and had all the properties of human nature, therefore the *person* of Christ ate and drank and made choices according to the properties of his human nature.
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Peter Wallace: “Christ was fully man and had all the properties of human nature”
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Did Christ have a deliberative (gnomic) will, in accordance with our human nature? The claim was made previously that:
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Peter Wallace: “But there is no deliberative will in Christ. After all, the divine will does not deliberate.”
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I’m having trouble reconciling those two statements.
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Peter Wallace: “… therefore the *person* of Christ ate and drank and made choices according to the properties of his human nature.”
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How did Christ deliberate, or make choices, if there is no deliberative will in Christ? Can a *person* deliberate apart from a deliberative will?
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Peter Wallace: “There are two natural energies in Christ — but there is one (person?) who acts. In the same way there are two natural wills in Christ — but there is one (person?) who wills.”
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I understand that the position holds that *wills* do not act, but only the one *Person* of Christ acts. But then we have this statement:
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Peter Wallace: “… the human will was always in submission to the divine and remained in perfect harmony with the divine.”
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How can the human will submit? There is only one (person) who acts/wills. I thought that the natural wills simply *are*, and that the person *acts*. This would seem to preclude the human will from submitting to the divine, of itself.
Again, any clarification is appreciated.
Notice the passive voice used in my quote: “the human will was always in submission.” Please pay more careful attention to the careful use of language.
In the same way, you seem to think that humans have two wills — the natural will and the deliberative will. That is simply false and absurd. The will is a property of human nature.
I recommend a careful reading (or three) of Maximus if you wish to interact further.
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Peter Wallace: “In the same way, you seem to think that humans have two wills — the natural will and the deliberative will.”
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My understanding is that humans have one natural deliberative will. But the claim was made that “there is no deliberative will in Christ”. This would indicate that Christ did not have all of the properties of human nature. I was hoping for clarification on that point.
Deliberation is what you do with your will. Wills do not deliberate. Persons deliberate. Deliberation is not a property, but an action.
Again, if you really are interested in this, read Maximus.
If wills do not deliberate in the first place, why was the claim made that “there is no deliberative will in Christ”? If wills do not deliberate, then there is no deliberative will in *anyone*. But if wills do not deliberate, and if “deliberation is not a property” of will, then how can Maximus speak of the deliberative (gnomic) will at all? Peter Wallace wrote:
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“persons act according to their natures”
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If a person deliberates, then it must be according to their nature to do so, thus deliberation must be a natural property, otherwise where does the act of deliberation come from? The argument was made that deliberation cannot come from the divine will, since the divine will does not deliberate.
So I am left with my original question. If Christ had no deliberative will, then how can it be said that Christ lacks no natural property of humanity, since we have deliberative wills, by nature?
If you take the same logic and apply it to the rational soul of Christ, you will see the problem.
Did Christ have a human rational soul? Yes. What do we do with our rational soul? We think. Does that mean that Christ had a *thinking* rational soul? No. Because *thinking* is what *we* do with our rational soul. The rational soul is a property of human nature — but what thinking is an action of the person. In the same way deliberation is what we do with our wills.
If you say that Christ had a thinking rational soul and a deliberative will, then you are saying that there were two centers of consciousness — that there was not only a human *property* of willing and acting, but also a human that willed and acted (separate from the divine).
Deliberation is no more a property of human nature than walking. (And walking is *not* a property of human nature. Walking is an *action* performed by *some* humans. Otherwise the cripple is not human).
If you are serious in your wish to understand what Maximus is saying, you really need to read Maximus. This is my last response.
Whoever painted the icon chose the wrong Maximos. The very big bearded Maximos is Maximos the Greek.
Just wanted to share that this icon is of Saint Maximos the Greek, not Maximos the Confessor
what is your explanation on the dispute of maximus with the severians ?